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Abstract 
 
The report describes the importance of oil for the EU economy and analyses the potential 
economic effects that current low oil prices since mid-2014 may have in the EU28 
economy. Further it assesses how the current oil price decrease may evolve up to 2020 
and the consequences for global oil consumption. The analysis shows that a decrease of 
the oil price from US$100 to US$50 may lead to a GDP gain of about 0.7%, both on a 
global level and in the EU28, driven by private consumption and investment. The global 
gains are not evenly distributed. Net oil importing countries gain, whereas oil exporting 
countries lose. The analysis mainly focuses on the EU28 and it shows that the more oil-
intensive countries and sectors gain more than the rest of the economy. A 50% decrease 
of the oil price may generate up to 3 million additional jobs (1.3% of the total labour 
force). Interestingly, oil-intensive sectors do not necessarily improve their 
competitiveness vis-à-vis their competitors in other regions, as non-EU producers may 
be less energy efficient and therefore benefit more from low oil prices. 
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1. Recent Evolutions of Crude Oil Price   
This report describes the importance of oil (imports) for the EU economy and analyzes 
the potential economic effects of the lower oil price in the EU28. Further it assesses how 
the current oil price decrease may evolve up to 2020 and the consequences for global oil 
consumption. 
Since the summer of 2014 the global price of crude oil shows a steep decrease which 
has not been seen since 2008. The maximum decrease (about -60%) took place 
between June 19th 2014 and January 13th 2015, with a stabilization around 50 $/bl 
since (Figure 1). This price drop remains below the one observed with the financial crisis 
in 2008 when the price plummeted with almost 75% between July and December 2008. 
The steep fall in price was then followed by a steady recovery to high levels that 
cumulated in 2012 around 120 $/bl. 
Figure 1: Daily oil price (Brent, current US$) 
 
Source: EIA1, latest data point: 13th October 2015 
The recent drop of the oil price raises several questions on the drivers of such a steep 
decrease and on the impact on the short term and long term price evolution. According 
to Arezki and Blanchard (December 2014), lower than expected demand between June 
and December 2014 accounts for only 20 to 35 percent of the price decline. Other 
explanations being put forward hint that the supply side effect is predominant.  Key 
producing countries in Middle-East and Northern Africa, such as Libya and Iraq, show 
high oil production levels despite political instability. The US has become the world’s 
largest oil producer thanks to new supply from unconventional sources. Saudi Arabia 
announced not to react on the increasing oil supply from both other OPEC and non-OPEC 
producers. The Saudis and their Gulf allies may not be willing to sacrifice their market 
share to restore the price, and see the low oil price as an attempt to reduce profits and 
investment, and eventually supply by non-OPEC countries. Saudi Arabia faces lower than 
average extraction costs and may be able to tolerate lower oil prices for quite some 
                                           
1 http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm 
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time. (The Economist, December 2014). For more details on the effects of the low oil 
price for Saudi Arabia, we refer to IMF (2015b). 
Moreover, various studies analyzed the correlation between the crude oil price and the 
US$ exchange rate (for an overview see Table 3 in Breitenfellner and Crespo Cuaresma 
(2008)). Over time, the negative relation between the U.S. dollar and the oil price, 
driven by the exchange rate, seems to get increasing support. Indeed, between March 
2014 and March 2015, the US dollar has appreciated with about 20% compared to the 
Euro, to levels not seen for more than 10 years.  
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2. Economic impact of low oil prices  
Oil consumption still remains one of the main pillars of our economies. The impact of the 
observed price decrease will depend on the import dependency and the oil intensity of 
the economy. In this respect, section 2.1 maps some descriptive statistics for EU 
Member States. Section 2.2 briefly sets out the specifics of the oil price scenario studied. 
The economic impact is reported in section 2.3 on a global scale and on the levels of the 
EU28, the EU15 and the EU132. Moreover, the GDP impacts on a member state level are 
graphically presented in order to track the impact variation across member states. The 
macro-economic effects of the low oil price scenarios are analysed using the global GEM-
E3 model (see Box 1).  
Box 1: GEM-E3 model 
The macro-economic impacts of the oil price scenarios are analysed with the GEM-E3 
model (www.gem-e3.net). It is a multi-region computable general equilibrium model 
that covers the interactions between the economy, the energy system and the 
environment. GEM-E3 covers the entire economy and can be used to evaluate 
consistently the distributional effects of policies on the national accounts, investment, 
consumption, public finance, foreign trade and employment for the various economic 
sectors and agents across the countries. The model includes all 28 Member States of the 
European Union and all major non-European countries.  The whole economy is 
represented in 21 economic sectors. The countries are linked through endogenous 
bilateral trade. The GEM-E3 results are of comparative static nature, and reflect the 
annual impact of imposing the lower oil price during a full year with the economy fully 
adapting to the new situation. In other words, the lagged impacts of oil price changes 
are observed to be spread over a couple of years, whereas in the GEM-E3 model they 
are assumed to happen immediately in the same year. Further, this methodology also 
assumes that the EU economy is in equilibrium. The model is calibrated using the GTAP 
83 database. 
The GEM-E3 model has been used to analyse the macro- economic effects of the climate, 
energy and air quality policies to support DG CLIMA, DG ENER, and DG ENV (e.g. 
SWD(2015) 17, SWD(2014) 15, SWD(2013)531, SWD(2013) 132). Ciscar et al. (2004) 
and Maisonnave et al. (2012) use earlier versions of the GEM-E3 model to simulate the 
impact of high oil prices (the latter focussing on the cross-relation with climate policies). 
Kitous et al. (2013) analyse a number of scenarios of the 2012 Iran crisis and the 
boycott imposed by the Western world.  
 
 
 
 
                                           
2 I.e. the Member States that joined before and after 2004, respectively. The EU13 
Member States are Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. The EU15 Member 
States are Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany, Italy, France, Ireland, 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
3 https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/ 
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2.1 The role of oil in the EU28 economies  
The descriptive statistics displayed in Figure 2 show the importance of crude oil imports 
as a share of the GDP of the countries of the EU in 2012. First of all, remark that 
Denmark is the only net exporter of crude oil in the EU. The production of crude oil 
exceeds the local consumption in Denmark, such that a significant amount can be 
exported, mainly the UK and Sweden (Eurostat International trade statistics). In terms 
of absolute quantities, the United Kingdom is the largest producer of crude oil in the EU 
(over 40000 kTOE; Eurostat, 2012). Nevertheless, the UK needs additional imports to 
meet the domestic demand. Furthermore, the value of net imports of crude relative to 
GDP appears to be highest in Lithuania and Bulgaria. The demand for crude oil is also 
correlated with the presence of oil refineries, indicated by yellow dots on Figure 2. The 
large refinery sites in Mazeikiu (Lithuania) and near the ports of Burgas (Bulgaria), 
Antwerp (Belgium) and Rotterdam (the Netherlands) explain part of the crude oil needs 
in these countries. 
Figure 2: Crude oil imports and refineries  
 
Source: Own calculation based on IEA and Enerdata 
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Figure 3 presents the final consumption of all final oil products4 relative to the GDP. This 
can be considered as a measure of oil consumption intensity of the economy. The total 
final consumption includes the non-energy consumption (e.g. in the chemical sector) and 
all energy consumption (including industry, transport, households) of oil products. Note 
that the oil intensity is influenced by differences in sector composition and energy 
efficiency across Member States. Figure 3 illustrates that the intensity of oil product 
consumption to GDP is relatively high in EU13. One explanation is that the share of total 
value added from industry is relatively high, whereas the share of services is relatively 
low in these countries. 
Figure 3: Oil products intensity 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat 
2.2 Scenario definition 
The type of analysis presented here is comparative static, which means that a scenario is 
compared to a Baseline for a given year (2015), and that it is not a projection or 
forecasting. A low oil price scenario has been developed, which is ceteris paribus in 
nature i.e. the change in oil price is the only difference between the scenario and the 
Baseline, while ignoring other likely shocks or events. 
                                           
4 In Tonnes of Oil Equivalent; excluding crude oil, natural gas liquids, refinery feedstock 
etc. 
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"Baseline": The "business-as-usual" development. Oil prices remain around US$ 100 
per barrel in 2015.  
"50% Scenario": This is the central scenario and assumes an oil price of US$ 50 per 
barrel in 2015, which is 50% lower as compared to the baseline in dollar terms. Global 
supply of crude oil is 7% higher than in the baseline. 
 
2.3 Results 
Table 1 reports the macro-economic impacts of the 50% Scenario. The Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) as well as its components5 are presented as a percentage difference from 
the Baseline. The GDP increase for the EU28 and the World is about 0.7%. These results 
are comparable with the analysis of Arezki and Blanchard (2014) who estimated, with a 
different methodology, a GDP increase of about 0.6% for EU28 and 0.7% for the World, 
for a permanent oil price decrease.  
Figure 4: Impact on GDP of central low oil price scenario for EU28 MS  
 
Source: JRC, GEM-E3 model 
 
 
                                           
5  The GDP can be decomposed into Investment, Private and Public Consumption, 
Exports, minus Imports. 
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Table 1: Macro-economic impacts of low oil price scenarios in 2015  
 
50% Scenario 
Compared to Baseline (%) EU28 EU15 EU13 World 
GDP 0.70 0.67 1.09 0.72 
Investment 1.22 1.20 1.52 1.11 
Private Consumption 1.02 0.95 1.90 0.78 
Exports 0.59 0.66 1.13  
Imports 1.70 1.52 2.11  
Energy input/GDP 1.20 1.10 1.42 1.27 
Source: JRC, GEM-E3 model 
GDP increases as oil supply is larger than in the baseline which stimulates the 
production, but also because the lower oil prices increase the purchasing power of the 
households and firms for the same budget.  The World GDP increase is driven by an 
increase of private consumption6 and investments. In EU28 this is complemented by the 
exports and imports.  
Table 1 shows that the imported volumes in EU28 increase more than the exports, in 
fact offsetting part of the gains in investment and private consumption. This is due to 
the fact that low oil prices increase the competitiveness of some non-EU regions, which 
are relatively more oil-intensive, more than the EU's competitiveness (see below). 
Overall, the energy intensities (in toe/$2004) of the World and EU28 economies are 
estimated to increase by about 1.2%.  
On a global scale the GDP increase masks unequal impacts from lower oil prices across 
countries. Winners are the (net) importing countries, while oil exporters are set to lose. 
Typically, the economies of oil exporting countries tend to depend relatively more on 
their oil production; oil-importing countries are more diversified with a lower relative 
dependence on oil. Further, the more oil-intensive the economy, the more the oil 
importing country benefits from lower oil prices (But the opposite is also true. Oil-
intensive countries are more vulnerable for higher oil prices). Another element is that 
with high (specific) taxes on oil, the same percentage decrease in the global oil price 
leads to smaller percentage decrease in the final price paid by firms and consumers. 
Similarly, the GDP impacts in the EU13, which are more oil intensive than the rest of the 
EU28, are more positive than in EU28 or EU15. Indeed, Figure 4 shows the same 
patterns among the Member States as the ones that can be observed for the size of the 
(net) imports and the oil intensity in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively. Interestingly, 
the countries showing the highest potential GDP increase in Figure 4 (mainly the 
southwest, the southeast and the Baltics) are among the countries that were most 
heavily affected by the different Iran Sanction Scenarios in Kitous et al. (2013). 
Table 2 presents the change in sectoral production for the 50% Scenario as compared to 
the Baseline case. On a global level, all sectors increase their production. The crude oil, 
refineries and cokes sector increase their production mainly thanks to higher crude oil 
                                           
6  Public consumption is kept constant compared to the baseline across the various 
scenarios, and therefore not reported in Table 1. 
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supply (7%). The oil-intensive transport sectors are among the other big gainers (2.31% 
and 1.54% for air and land, respectively). As a result, the transport equipment sector 
increases by 1.94%.  Energy-intensive sectors such as chemicals and ferrous and non-
ferrous metals show increases ranging between 1.00% and 1.40%. Other less oil-
intensive sectors increase by less than 1%.  Finally, the overall higher economic activity 
boosts the electricity production by 1.32%. 
Table 2: Sectoral Production in 2015 
 
50% Scenario 
Compared to Baseline (%) EU28 EU15 EU13 World 
Agriculture 0.58 0.46 1.20 0.22 
Coal 0.74 0.12 1.51 1.40 
Oil, Refineries and Cokes 2.85 2.25 7.49 4.39 
Gas 0.29 -0.05 3.75 2.08 
Electricity supply 1.00 0.85 1.75 1.32 
Ferrous metals 0.35 0.28 0.96 1.37 
Non-ferrous  metals 0.97 0.98 0.94 1.11 
Chemical Products -1.37 -1.52 0.86 1.02 
Paper Products 0.48 0.49 0.41 0.57 
Non-metallic minerals 1.11 1.07 1.49 0.99 
Electric Goods 1.94 2.01 1.63 0.83 
Transport equipment 2.41 2.54 1.32 1.97 
Other Equipment Goods 1.40 1.42 1.17 1.07 
Consumer Goods Industries 0.64 0.63 0.68 0.22 
Construction 1.13 1.11 1.36 1.06 
Transport (Air) 0.83 0.68 4.47 2.31 
Transport (Land) 1.62 1.58 2.04 1.54 
Transport (Water) 2.42 2.44 2.07 0.56 
Market Services 0.74 0.73 1.00 0.66 
Non Market Services 0.22 0.21 0.36 0.31 
Source: JRC, GEM-E3 model 
The results for the EU28 are roughly similar to those for the World. However, some 
difference may be observed.  A trade-exposed energy-intensive sector like ferrous 
metals shows production gains of only 0.35% (about 1/4 of the global increase). The 
chemical sector even shows production losses. The reason for this is the fact that these 
sectors in countries like India or USA are more oil-intensive7 than in EU28, and, hence, 
become relatively more competitive compared to their peers in the EU28. In other 
words, production with lower oil-intensity in the EU28 may be substituted for more oil-
intensive imports from elsewhere. 
  
 
                                           
7 Energy and fuel subsidies are taken in to account to the extent they are reflected in the 
GTAP8 data. 
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Table 3: Sectoral Employment in 2015 
 
50% Scenario 
Compared to Baseline (%) EU28 EU15 EU13 World 
Agriculture 0.83 0.66 1.07 0.05 
Coal 1.96 0.44 2.46 1.43 
Oil, Refineries and Cokes 13.01 8.50 17.71 7.44 
Gas 2.08 0.89 3.33 2.48 
Electricity supply 1.42 0.84 1.94 1.52 
Ferrous metals 1.02 0.57 2.04 2.38 
Non-ferrous  metals 1.45 1.35 1.82 1.46 
Chemical Products -0.44 -0.98 1.88 2.77 
Paper Products 1.01 0.92 1.43 0.71 
Non-metallic minerals 1.67 1.53 2.01 1.11 
Electric Goods 2.36 2.26 2.59 0.99 
Transport equipment 2.67 2.75 2.38 1.98 
Other Equipment Goods 1.69 1.64 1.86 1.32 
Consumer Goods Industries 1.18 1.13 1.26 0.39 
Construction 2.02 1.81 2.79 1.24 
Transport (Air) 2.21 1.73 6.69 4.12 
Transport (Land) 3.05 2.49 4.61 2.61 
Transport (Water) 1.42 1.10 2.78 0.63 
Market Services 1.69 1.54 2.92 0.97 
Non Market Services 0.54 0.46 0.91 0.25 
Power Technologies 1.47 0.91 1.90 1.57 
Source: JRC, GEM-E3 model 
Employment effects (Table 3) follow by large the same pattern as sectoral production 
changes. In the 50% Scenario, the low oil price generates about 3 million new jobs in 
the EU28, or a decrease in the unemployment rate of about 1.3%. In absolute terms, 
large and labour-intensive sectors such as the Market and non-Market Services, 
Construction and the equipment goods generate most of the new employment.  
In the global economy, household consumption accounts for 2/3 of the GDP growth, with 
investment driving the other 1/3. In the EU28 the household consumption drives about 
83% of the GDP growth (and investment still 33%) as part of the growth is neutralized 
by a worsened trade balance (-16%) due to a relatively higher increase of imports. The 
highest increases can be observed in fuel and heating- and transport-related goods 
(Table 4). 
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Table 4: Household Consumption in 2015 
 
50% Scenario 
Compared to Baseline (%) EU28 EU15 EU13 World 
Food beverages and tobacco 0.39 0.33 0.90 -0.03 
Clothing and footwear 0.65 0.61 1.29 0.35 
Housing and water charges 0.56 0.52 1.12 0.23 
Fuels and power 2.07 1.84 3.33 2.53 
Household equipment and 
operation  
0.73 0.69 1.46 0.59 
Heating and cooking appliances 4.23 3.93 6.84 3.97 
Medical care and health 1.04 0.96 2.02 0.45 
Purchase of vehicles 4.10 3.94 7.52 4.58 
Operation of personal transport 
equipment 
2.45 2.32 4.30 2.90 
Transport services 2.92 2.81 4.32 2.65 
Communication 0.49 0.44 0.98 0.01 
Recreational services 0.98 0.90 2.25 0.81 
Miscellaneous goods and services 0.74 0.69 1.54 0.32 
Education 0.58 0.52 1.21 0.20 
Source: JRC, GEM-E3 model 
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3. Potential short-term evolution of the oil price  
 
3.1 Scenarios  
The POLES model describes 80 producing countries and 6 types of produced oil: crude 
and NGLs, tar sands, extra heavy oil, shale oil, deep offshore, arctic oil.  
The graph below displays various production costs: the average production cost (green 
dashed line), as calculated over all producers and oil types (stable around 20 $05/bl due 
to the low, stable extraction costs in the Gulf countries). It displays also the average 
production cost of the 95th percentile (light blue dashed line), 98thpercentile, 
99thpercentile and 99.5th percentile. The latter is considered as the maximum production 
cost. The thick red line represents the historical evolution of oil price. The average 2015 
includes daily data up to 13th October 2015 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 5: Yearly oil price vs production cost  
 
Source: POLES-JRC model 
Figure 5 illustrates that the oil price was mostly above the production cost for 95% of 
the production during the last decade. Currently, the price is far below that level, which 
suggests that longer term oil price should be higher than the present one. Low oil price 
is likely to reduce investment in production capacity, which may lead to an upward 
evolution of the oil price once the supply gets negatively affected. On the other hand, 
increasing energy efficiency measures in the context of global climate negotiations could 
weaken future oil demand which would limit a rebound of oil price.  
In the absence of certainty on how the oil price might develop in the coming years and 
how this may affect the evolution of oil demand and import cost by 2020, three 
scenarios were analyzed with the energy model POLES-JRC:  
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10% Scenario: Under this hypothesis we assume that the whole range of oil production 
costs are entirely covered by the (endogenous) oil price8, as it was the case in 2005-
2013. As a consequence of this, drilling and extracting activity would lead the price at a 
fairly high level in the coming years (around 80 $05/bl), which is only 10% lower than 
the levels in June 2014 (and close to the average 2011 price).  
40% Scenario: In this scenario, it is assumed that the top 5% most expensive 
percentile oil resources extraction costs remain uncovered by oil price8 (i.e. the most 
expensive non-conventional resources would continue to operate with losses).  This 
scenario leads to a 2015 price 40% lower than the June 2014 level. 
50% Scenario:  The price is 50% lower than the June 2014 level. This scenario is 
consistent with the "50% Scenario" analyzed in Section 2, driven by increased 
production from Gulf swing producers, and the one discussed by Arezki and Blanchard 
(2014). 
Figure 6 below gives the potential evolution of the yearly-averaged oil price up to 2020 
for these 3 scenarios, and shows how these would compare to the daily price of 19th 
June 2014 and the average price in 2015 (data up to 13th October 2105) (as well as the 
period back to 1990). 
Figure 6: Yearly oil price (Brent): history vs. scenarios 
 
Source: POLES-JRC model 
  
                                           
8  As calculated by the POLES-JRC model: over all producers and all oil types 
(conventional and non-conventional: extra heavy, tar, shale oil, ultra deep, etc.) 
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3.2 Impact of oil demand and oil imports  
 
The scenarios analysed would lead to slightly different developments of World oil 
demand, which would be growing faster in the low oil price scenario, increasing from 4.2 
Gtoe in 2010 to 4.5 Gtoe by 2020 in the "10% Scenario" (the highest oil price), 4.75 
Gtoe in the "40% Scenario" case and to 4.9 Gtoe in the "50% Scenario" (the lowest oil 
price). Although all regions would increase oil demand with lower prices, the positive 
impact on oil demand would greatly depend on the structure of domestic prices of oil 
products: with lower (specific) taxes, the impact of the three scenarios on the USA and 
China would be stronger than for the EU at retail sale level. 
Figure 7: Oil demand 2005-2020: World, EU, USA, China 
 
 
Source: POLES-JRC model 
As a consequence of a lower oil price, the cost of net oil imports would decrease for the 
three scenarios (even though the demand and volumes imported tend to increase). This 
is in particular true for the EU28, where a prolonged low oil price ("50% scenario") would 
lead to a cost reduction equivalent to 1% of the GDP on the short term compared to 
average of 2013 and early 2014. In the three scenarios the cost of imports is lower than 
what has been observed since 2006 when the cost stayed on average above 2% of GDP. 
Indeed, the fairly high oil price of the past 8 years has led to a progressive decline in 
demand in the EU (as shown in Figure 7 above) that translates into lower volumes of 
imports in 2014 and beyond than what was the case in 2006-2013. Consequently, even 
in the "10% Scenario", which displays the highest oil price projection, the cost of imports 
is likely to stay below 2% of EU GDP (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Crude Oil and Oil Products imports as share of GDP (MER) for EU28 
 
Source: POLES-JRC model 
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4. Conclusions and Caveats 
 
This report describes the importance of oil (imports) for the EU economy and analyses 
the potential economic effects of the lower oil price in the EU28. Further it assesses how 
the current oil price decrease may evolve up to 2020 and the consequences for global oil 
consumption. 
The analysis shows that a decrease of the oil price from US$100 to US$50 may lead to a 
GDP gain of about 0.7%, both on a global level and in the EU28, driven by private 
consumption and investment. The global gains are not evenly distributed. Net oil 
importing countries gain, whereas oil exporting countries lose. The analysis mainly 
focuses on the EU28 and it shows that the more oil-intensive countries and sectors gain 
more than the rest of the economy. A 50% decrease of the oil price may generate up to 
3 million additional jobs (1.3% of the total labour force). Interestingly, oil-intensive 
sectors do not necessarily improve their competitiveness vis-à-vis their competitors in 
other regions, as non-EU producers may be less energy efficient and therefore benefit 
more from low oil prices. 
The economic analysis is in comparative static terms, i.e. compared to a Baseline and 
the results are not projections. The low oil price scenario is ceteris paribus in nature i.e. 
the change in oil price is the only difference between the scenario and the Baseline. 
Indeed the analysis, does not take into account any policy reactions that may happen 
because of this major price shift. Crude oil producers (de facto Saudi Arabia, the main 
swing producer) may decide to tighten the oil supply in order to bring the price to higher 
levels. Other governments may decide to increase or decrease public spending, or their 
tax rates. In fact the IMF (2015a) recommends using the lower oil prices in order to 
abolish fuel/energy subsidies which are a major burden on the government budget of 
various, mainly developing or emerging, economies. In the analysis presented here, we 
assume that all industries in all countries face an identical relative price reduction. As 
such, the oil price differential across countries is not assumed to narrow due to a drop in 
the oil price. In addition, no changes in the price of other natural resources are imposed 
exogenously. This could be relevant especially for natural gas, since long-term gas 
contracts may feature oil-indexed price components.  
Another caveat is that the methodology does not allow for the appreciation or 
depreciation of currencies, changes inflation or interest rate decisions by the central 
banks. Finally, the analysis did not consider any dramatic worsening of the situations in 
geo-strategically important places like Ukraine or the Middle East.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the economic analysis is of a static nature. Whether 
the current oil price is maintainable in the mid- to long-run is uncertain. The last part of 
the report shows that the oil price is likely to rise in the coming years to cover the cost 
of the most expensive production. 
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